Abstract. In 2001, baseball announced plans to fold two teams. This
(1) W i = m P i (q i , s i , s~i,m i )dq i + v i (s i , s~i) -C(q i , s i ). 0
For convenience the multiple integral over all product quantities is written in vector notation, with q i * the vector of outputs at equilibrium prices. The cost function, C(*), incorporates the cost of team quality and other costs associated with the team, such as providing in-stadium services, selling tickets, and negotiating broadcast rights.
The term v i is the indirect value of ownership that is not captured in net revenues. The annualized value of teams to owners may not be limited to the team's net revenues, but may include other sources of value. Examples are benefits to ancillary businesses that have synergies with the team (e.g., broadcasting), publicity for celebrity-seeking owners that can not be obtained from a more prosaic business, or the consumption value of hobby ownership.
The market value of a team is the discounted present value of the stream of benefits accruing to the owner, which is the sum of net operating revenues and indirect value, v i . The term inside the integral in (1) can be decomposed into parts captured by investors, players and others who earn rent, or p i q i -C(*), and the part captured by customers, which is the value of the integral less payments by customers to the team, p i q i . If c(*) is the financial (pecuniary) cost of inputs, then the operating revenue earned by owners is p i q i -c(*) and the rent earned by other inputs is c(*) -C(*). If a team has a positive market value in its current location, the sum of operating revenues, whether positive or negative, and indirect value must be positive.
The key assumptions about the functions in (1) are that prices, indirect team value and costs are increasing in team quality (s i ), that prices are increasing in market size (m i ), that prices are decreasing in output, and that costs are increasing in output. If teams maximize operating revenues (not social welfare or victories) and the player market is competitive -i.e., the effect of one team's decisions about playing skills on other teams is sufficiently small that teams ignore these responses -then a team acquires player skills up to the point at which the incremental value of skills to the owner equals the financial cost of acquiring more player skills. The incremental value of skills is the sum of the incremental value to customers as measured by the integral in (1) plus the incremental value of skill to the owner as captured by v i . Because teams compete for players and trade players if their skills are more valuable elsewhere, teams are likely to face roughly the same cost of acquiring a player of given skills. Thus, the incremental contribution of additional skill to the value of a team is approximately equal to its cost, and to the incremental social benefit of skill in each locality. In this sense, a competitive market for players produces an economically efficient allocation of skills among teams because the incremental value of a unit of skills is the same everywhere.
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According to the preceding theoretical model, differences in team quality arise for two reasons. First, differences in market characteristics, m i , cause optimal skills, s i , to differ. Second, differences in the indirect value of a team arising from differences in tastes and other business objectives among owners can have the same effect. For example, an owner that is a national broadcaster of its team's home games is likely to derive more indirect value from team quality than an owner without such interests. If the number of viable national broadcasters of baseball games is fewer than the number of teams, this source of valuation differences will persist. Consequently, the net social benefit of a team is likely to depend on where it plays and who owns it. The latter point is absent from most public debates about the causes and implications competitive imbalance and the social impact of contraction. The indirect value of ownership properly is just a source of economic demand for sports, equivalent to a very high season ticket price (millions of dollars) for the best seat in the house -the owner's box!
Opportunity Costs
Actual team expenditures differ from opportunity costs because the two most important inputs to a baseball team, players and stadiums, usually are not priced at their opportunity cost.
The decision to add or subtract a team directly affects the number of baseball players to be employed within the sport. In baseball, adding a team creates 25 more on-field roster spots, 15 more additional roster spots on assignment to minor leagues, and about 100 additional minor league roster positions. Adding one more team to major-league baseball implies adding over 100
professional baseball players to the sport.
Minor league players probably are paid approximately their opportunity cost. Some drafted players elect not to sign professional contracts, indicating that the prospect of a baseball career is not their best option. Some minor league players who initially are willing to play in the minor leagues subsequently retire voluntarily, as opposed to being cut or not being offered a contract renewal. The minimum salary for players on the 40-man roster but not the 25-man roster, who represent the top of the minor league hierarchy, is $50,000, which is about the average salary for college graduates in their 20s. These players are among the highest paid minor leaguers, so other minor league wages are not likely to differ greatly from opportunity costs.
In contrast to minor leaguers, the vast majority of major league players earn substantially more than the wage they would earn in their next best occupation. In the 1996 collective bargaining agreement, the minimum salary for players on the 25-man roster was $200,000, and in the 2002 agreement it was $300,000. Average salaries on opening day of the 2002 season ranged from $1.2 million for Tampa Bay to $4.3 million for the New York Yankees. While a few star players move on from baseball to comparably lucrative careers in broadcasting and entertainment, the vast majority face far less lucrative alternative occupations. Hence, a large fraction of baseball salaries is rent -earnings in excess of opportunity cost that are part of the net social benefits of a team. Thus, the opportunity cost of the 40 players on an average major league roster probably is less than $5 million, composed of between $30,000 and $100,000 for all but one or two superstars who could switch to a lucrative career elsewhere. Whereas the precise magnitude of this figure can be debated, it surely is much lower than the $71 million average team payroll in 2001.
Because owners derive value from net operating income and because skilled baseball players are scarce, competition among owners causes the wage of players to exceed their opportunity cost outside baseball. As a result, a team that has a negative franchise value (the sum of operating revenues and annualized indirect value is negative) might have positive net social value. Such a team would have a positive franchise value if its players were paid their opportunity cost instead of their market wage. If a team is contracted because it has a negative franchise value, causing the players to lose the rents that they derive from their jobs and local fans to lose their team, all of the groups involved -fans, owners and players -plausibly could be made better off by lowering player salaries, including the minimum.
Another departure of measured costs from opportunity costs pertains to stadiums. Most major league baseball teams play in highly subsidized playing facilities. 3 During the 1990s, a boom in stadium construction gave many teams access to stadiums worth $250 million or more with little or no cost to the team. Using an opportunity cost of capital of ten percent (real), the annualized social cost of new baseball stadiums is $20-30 million, which is the opportunity cost of a stadium if one needs to be built to keep a team. Baseball stadiums have almost no uses other than for baseball, and even the few other uses (rock concerts, football games, and exotic sports like tractor pulls and rodeos) easily can be scheduled around baseball events. Hence, a baseball stadium, once built, is a sunk cost, and its continued use is not part of a team's opportunity cost.
A forward-looking analysis of stadium cost is appropriate in two cases: expansion that requires a new stadium and contraction threats focusing on teams that play in old facilities to induce cities to build a new stadium. In these cases welfare analysis should include the forwardlooking cost of the stadium and the impact of the stadium on revenues, surplus and other costs.
Externalities
Expression (1) is an incomplete statement of the net benefits of a baseball team because it does not take into account the effect of one team on the relative quality of, and hence demand for, other teams. The size of this effect depends on the identity of the teams to be contracted. In baseball (and, should it come to pass, hockey), the contraction targets are the weakest teams;
however, in Scotland the targets were the two dominant teams.
The economic theory of a sports leagues set forth initially by El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) concludes that a team in the least lucrative market will spend the least on players, and so field the weakest team. As a result, the contracted team's strength, revenues, and consumers' surplus will be below average. Contraction will cause every other team to play fewer games against weak teams, to win fewer games, and to have a lower won-loss percentage.
Consider a five-team league (teams A, B, C, D and E) with a sixteen-game schedule.
Assume that differences among markets cause a quality ordering of teams that is A>B>C>D>E, and that the probability of beating the next weakest team is 75 percent while the probability of beating other weaker teams is 100 percent. In this set-up, the expected final standings are:
Suppose that the league contracts by dropping D and E, but retains a sixteen-game schedule. If relative team quality does not change, the expected standings of the contracted league are:
The comparative competitive balance of these standings is ambiguous. The post-contraction league is more balanced in that the spread in won-loss records is narrower; however, the smaller league is less balanced in that its pennant race is not as close and the probability that the secondplace team, B, will win the championship is lower.
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The preceding example assumes that no adjustment in relative team quality after contraction. If fans perceive that the contracted league with the same relative team qualities is less balanced (A is now 99 percent likely to win the championship), the economic theory of a league concludes that the optimal relative strength of A will be lesser and of C will be greater than in the larger league. Just how much more balanced relative team strength will be depends on the responsiveness of team revenues to relative team quality. In addition, under standard assumptions about the market for players, the contraction of D and E will cause their best players to replace the worst players on A, B and C, so that the absolute quality of the remaining teams is higher after contraction.
The net welfare generated by the remaining teams, therefore, could be higher or lower after contraction. Acting to improve welfare is the expectation that higher average team quality will increase demand in the remaining cities. Acting to diminish welfare is the fact that the worst remaining team will now finish at the bottom of the standings rather than in the middle. Possibly going in either direction is the effect of contraction on competitive balance as measured by differences in winning percentages, since the equilibrium difference in quality and expected standings could leave either a larger or smaller gap in expected victories between adjacent teams.
The key to determining whether league balance changes lies in the relationship between market characteristics, the responsiveness of revenues to team quality, and the welfare consequences of this effect (the term in the integral in (1)), which can be written as:
where K i (*) corresponds to the value component that is independent of team quality, and F i (*) corresponds to the component of value that is sensitive to quality. This formulation captures two notions. First, some cities, abstracting from measures of market demographics, are simply good sports towns compared to others (e.g., K i is larger for some i than for others, holding its arguments fixed). Second, some cities have fair-weather fans who only support winners (e.g., dF i /ds i is larger in some cities than in others for the same values of the arguments of the function). The effect of contraction on competitive balance depends on whether the contracting teams have relatively low or high responsiveness to quality.
If contracted teams have below-average responsiveness to quality, eliminating them will improve balance, but if they have above-average responsiveness to quality (with a low value for K i to cause them to be financially weak), contraction causes competitive balance to worsen. The latter circumstance could support a pre-contraction equilibrium in which financially weak teams do not spend the least on players and do not have the weakest records.
The most common implementation of (2) assumes that the function determining local revenues and consumers' surplus is the same in all cities, the marginal value of quality exhibits diminishing returns, and, for any given value of quality, the marginal value of quality is higher in better markets. If so, eliminating weak teams will improve balance, causing an increase in the welfare created by the remaining teams. Whether the latter effect is sufficient to offset the loss of welfare in cities that lose teams depends on the relative values of market characteristics (the differences among teams in market size) and the sensitivity of team value to relative quality.
Empirical work on the economics of sports has yet to address these issues, so a definitive conclusion must await further research. Nevertheless, the data on away-game attendance of baseball teams show that market characteristics and home team quality have a greater effect on attendance than the quality of visitors. Table 1 shows the away game attendance of the five teams with the best and worst records during the 2002 season. 5 The eleven best teams averaged 2.42 million away attendance, while the ten worst teams averaged 2.32 million. This difference is biased downward as a measure of the importance of the quality of the visiting team because the missing venue for the good teams has higher average attendance than the missing site for the bad teams; however, the magnitude of this bias is not very large because each team accounts for a small fraction of the schedule of every other team. 6 Thus, the difference in drawing power on the road between good and bad teams probably is between 100,000 and 200,000 fans per season.
The home attendance for these same teams in 2002 is shown in Table 2 . These differences arise from quality differentials and local market variation (better teams tend to be in better markets, notwithstanding the poor performances in 2002 of Chicago, Colorado and New
York in the National League). The average home attendance for the eleven strongest teams was 2.83 million, while for the weakest the average was 2.11 million, a difference of 700,000.
This analysis implies that team quality and market conditions account for substantially more attendance than the quality of the opposition. If so, eliminating two weak teams from a league is not likely to have much effect on attendance (and social benefits) elsewhere. Taking the mid-point of the range of estimates discussed above, the aggregate increase in home attendance in the rest of the league from folding a weak team (but maintaining the same number of home games in the schedule) is less than 20 percent of the home attendance of the two weakest franchises in 2002, Florida and Montreal.
The preceding suggests a strategy for measuring how contraction affects social welfare.
The test is whether locally generated surplus exceeds the real external benefit to the rest of the league from folding the team. Locally generated revenues include some revenues that accrue to the league through national rights sales; however, for leagues as large as major league baseball, the incremental national revenue from a weak team is likely to be small. The costs of a team should be measured as opportunity cost, which implies including in the benefits of a team the rents in player salaries but in some cases subtracting the annualized cost of free stadiums.
THE DECISION TO CONTRACT
This section examines the conditions under which all but one team in a league would agree that the remaining team should be eliminated from the league. As the term is commonly used, contraction refers to a decision by a league to put a team out of business, rather than a decision by a team to exit the industry, and so, if economically motivated, is based on the effect of eliminating the team on the net revenues of other teams. Thus, the decision to contract ignores the effect on player rents and consumers' surplus generated by the target team. The decision also ignores the net operating revenues (profits) of the contracted team if contraction is undertaken without compensating the team's owner. For example, the decision to expel Celtics and Rangers from the Scottish Premier League did not contemplate compensating them.
In considering contraction, baseball assumed that owners of contracted teams would be compensated. To eliminate Minnesota and Montreal, the remaining teams planned to purchase the Twins and Expos and then dismantle them. In fact, Montreal was acquired but has not been dismantled. These plans suggest that the contracted targets had a positive market value.
Two factors could explain baseball's decision to make contraction voluntary. First, as a legal matter, a U.S./Canada league may not be able to expel a team that has not violated league rules. Second, if a league legally can expel a team, each team could fear that it might be nextor that a majority might use the threat of expulsion to coerce it into transferring value to the majority, as happened in Scotland. For example, all of the weaker franchises in the league might fear that involuntary contraction will hit them next, and so be unwilling to vote for contracting the first team in the absence of a policy to compensate its owner.
The previous section explains how one team affects the welfare of others. Contraction allows remaining teams to remove the burden of playing home games against weak teams. In addition, contraction plausibly could narrow the spread in team quality, resulting in higher attendance in each remaining city. While the latter effect may explain the vote to expel Celtics and Rangers, the perpetual top teams in Scotland, it is unlikely to be the reason for contraction in baseball. Because baseball has so many teams and because away attendance is so similar among teams, eliminating two is not likely to have more than a minor effect on relative team quality and local revenues among remaining teams. Instead, the main incentive to contract derives from league rules regarding revenue sharing and team relocation.
The value of a team to an owner -and hence the compensation needed for contraction to be voluntary -is determined by the returns to ownership, or the sum of net operating revenues and the indirect value of a team. The first component is the discounted present value of the future stream of expected net revenues, using the risk-adjusted opportunity cost of capital for calculating the discount factor. Expected revenue is the sum of unshared home revenues plus the team's proportion of shared revenues. 
The benefit is the sum on the left side of (3) (away game shared revenues) and the part of W(*) from local revenues, or W(R i , 3X i , Z) -W(R i , 0, Z).
If a team has average local revenues, its away game revenues will equal its home game payments to visitors. If team revenues are larger (smaller) than average, the team will experience a net loss (gain) from home-away revenue sharing. If the function W(*) provides more revenues to teams with lower revenues (i.e., dW/dR i < 0), the difference between payments and receipts will be greater for both high and low revenue teams.
Baseball began sharing revenues in the 19 th Century, giving the visiting team a share of ticket sales. After the passage of the Sports Broadcasting Act in 1962, which allowed leagues to sell exclusive broadcasting rights, baseball began selling national rights to a "game of the week"
and dividing the revenues equally.
games sold as "local" broadcasts, baseball interceded to sell national cable rights and to divide these revenues equally. In both cases, baseball's decisions took away revenue from teams that had successfully sold broadcasting rights into a national market and increased the value of those rights by reducing competition among teams in the broadcast market.
Until 1997 Revenue sharing creates a disincentive to acquire player skills. An owner maximizes the value of the team by acquiring more playing skills until the increment to team value from one more unit of skill equals its price. Revenue sharing taxes the revenues derived from skill. If wages are constant, every team would seek to acquire less playing skill under a system that had more revenue sharing. An anomalous feature of the past two collective bargaining agreements is that they actually work to worsen competitive balance by imposing a higher marginal tax on financially weak teams.
Another effect of revenue sharing is to reduce the overall demand for players. Reduced demand causes lower salaries. Most likely, the number of players who are willing to play major league baseball is almost totally insensitive to changes in wages (that is, supply is close to perfectly inelastic). If so, the greater revenue sharing in the new agreement should cause average salaries to drop by the change in the average tax rate on revenues, or about 16 percent.
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The fall in player salaries will have no immediate effect on the net welfare created by a baseball team, as set forth in equation (1). 10 The agreement transfers revenue from one form of rent (wages in excess of opportunity cost) to another (value derived from ownership). The only effect of baseball's revenue sharing on economic welfare is through the split pool, which rewards low revenues. Higher taxes on quality for cities that field weaker teams causes leagues to be less balanced than in an untaxed (or equally taxed) regime, and in so doing reduces welfare.
The purpose of the elaboration of the revenue-sharing rules is to shed light on the effect of revenue sharing on contraction incentives. Revenue sharing benefits teams with low revenues.
It reduces the financial penalty of weak markets and bad teams. Revenue sharing also transfers wealth from players to owners by reducing player salaries without creating a significant financial disincentive for players to continue their career because of the gap between player salaries and opportunity costs. Thus, revenue sharing always makes weak teams more valuable.
If shared revenues are divided equally, the value of strong teams also will increase if their net cost of revenue sharing is smaller than the resulting reduction in player salaries. The benefit of revenue sharing to strong teams is the tax rate times the team's player salary bill. If player salaries account for most revenues and revenues do not differ too greatly from the average, the benefit will exceed the cost. This condition holds true for all teams except the Yankees.
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Greater revenue sharing makes weak teams less willing to be contracted, but it increases the financial incentive of stronger teams to contract weak teams. Contracting weak teams causes a net increase in shared revenue for each remaining team. If revenue sharing is skewed to provide disproportionately large benefits to the weakest teams -as in baseball -the incentive to contract weak teams is greater than would be the case if shared revenues were divided equally.
The next section uses baseball data to quantify this effect.
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE INCENTIVE TO CONTRACT
This section uses the reported financial information from major league baseball to ascertain the net social benefits of teams and to estimate the incentive to eliminate weak teams.
The basis for this analysis is the financial information that was reported by the Commissioner of
Baseball in his testimony before Congress in December 2001. These data were prepared before the final financial results of the 2001 season were tallied, and contain estimates for missing data.
These data were not audited, so that accounting inconsistencies across teams have not been corrected. Finally, the report does not report gross revenue sharing payments and receipts, the components of player costs (salaries, benefits, signing bonuses and performance bonuses), and the categories of non-player costs (stadium costs, salaries of front-office personnel, legal fees, etc.). All of these limitations make these data less useful for estimating operating profits and the less an allowance for stadium costs. Public statements by baseball officials indicate that the gross amount of revenue sharing was $400 million, but this amount may be an understatement since it implies an average allowance for stadium costs of roughly $27 million per team, which seems high.
Player Costs are not clearly defined, and the treatment of bonuses and payments to players who are no longer active is explained. These numbers presumably include the wages and benefits of the 40-man roster. Other Costs probably include minor league costs, but whether these are net of affiliation fees is not stated, and the costs of the stadium, day-of-game personnel, executives, managers and coaches, marketing, and legal services. Operating Income is the reported difference between revenues and costs after revenue sharing, but not including interest, depreciation, amortization, and taxes other than sales tax.
Social Welfare Analysis
The net social benefits of a baseball team are consumers' surplus plus local revenues (before adjustment for revenue sharing but including the share of national revenues that are attributable to the local team) minus opportunity costs. Positive net social benefits implies that some allocation of team costs among stakeholders -customers, owners, employees and other input suppliers -would leave net benefits to all from its continued existence.
Consumers' surplus.
To estimate consumers' surplus requires knowing team demand for all relevant prices, including the lowest price at which sales are zero. A reliable estimate of demand at prices outside the range of observed data is not possible, so the best one can do is to provide plausible illustrative calculations. Because the marginal cost of attendance, broadcasts, or rights fees from concession are all very low, economic theory predicts that a profitmaximizing sports team will set prices slightly above the point at which demand has unit elasticity. This information provides a basis for estimating consumers' surplus, or the net economic benefit that a team's customers derive from its presence.
If the demand for each baseball output is linear and the elasticity of demand at the current price is unity, the consumers' surplus generated by a team is equal to half of its gross local revenues (including sales tax). Using the data in Table 3 and assuming that sales tax account for ten percent of revenues, the consumers' surplus from local revenues for the average team is about $52 million, plus sales taxes of about $5 million.
Linear demand most likely produces too conservative an estimate of surplus because it implies that the prices at which sales would be zero is roughly double current prices, which does not seem plausible. 12 Even so, the sum of sales taxes and consumers' surplus from linear demand is larger than the reported operating loss for all teams except Montreal and Toronto.
Opportunity Cost Adjustments. The social surplus of baseball includes the difference between financial and opportunity costs of baseball inputs. As explained above, the average opportunity cost of a 40-man roster is probably under $5 million while the average player payroll in 2001 was $71 million, so that at least $65 million is a social benefit in the form of player rents.
For teams on the verge of contraction or relocation (or for expansion teams), the opportunity cost includes the annualized cost of a new stadium to keep (or to obtain) the team regardless of whether the team or the local community pays for it. The annualized cost of contemporary stadiums is approximately $25 million.
Other costs of baseball teams also probably contain hidden rents. In 1993, the year before the strike, baseball reported average other costs per team of $30.6 million. In 2001 these costs were reported to be $54.6 million. 13 In the intervening years, average team attendance was down about five percent, and inflation increased prices by about 25 percent. If average real costs per fan were constant, expenditures per team would have been about $37 million, not $55 million.
Indeed, between 1993 and 2001, baseball revenues per team increased by 74 percent, while other costs increased by 78 percent. The plausible explanations for these trends are either that the figures are inaccurate, reflecting a desire to appear poor for congressional hearings and collective bargaining, or that the data include extra payments to managers and owners as rewards for revenue growth, and so are rents. In either case, the opportunity costs for inputs other than players are lower than reported.
Whereas the rents in other costs are uncertain, a lower bound is the increase in real costs per real dollar of revenue, which is about $5 million per team. A more plausible estimate is the increase in real costs per fan, which is $18 million per team, although this estimate also could be low because it implicitly assumes that other costs contained no rents in 1993. Thus, this number is likely to be more than the reported average operating loss of $7.7 million per team in 2001.
Net Welfare Effects of Contraction. The net welfare effect of contraction depends on whether teams with low revenues create a net social benefit. The primary contraction targets in 2001 were Montreal and Minnesota, which had the lowest local revenues in that year, $10 million and $32 million, respectively.
Using the methods developed here, Montreal generated consumers' surplus from local operations of at least $5 million, plus another $1 million in tax revenues. Montreal's player payroll was $38 million, implying rents to players of at least $33 million. Finally, Montreal's other costs were $35 million, the lowest in baseball. If other costs equaled opportunity costs and if revenue sharing is ignored, Montreal had a net operating loss over opportunity costs of $30 million. If none of national revenue was due to Montreal and if the indirect value of ownership was zero, the Expos generated social benefits that exceed social costs by at least $9 million.
Minnesota had local revenues of $32 million, player costs of $30.5 million, and other costs of $44.3 million. Using the same calculation procedures, Minnesota generated at least $17 million in consumers' surplus, $3 million in taxes, and $26 million in player rents. If all other costs reflect opportunity costs, the difference between local revenues and opportunity costs was about $18 million, so that Minnesota generated a social surplus of $28 million.
The preceding calculations ignore the external benefit of eliminating weak teams. For reasons given above, this number is likely to be about $5 million dollars per year: 150,000 in attendance at away games times a net revenue from all in-stadium sources of $30 per fan. These calculations also ignore the indirect benefits of ownership. Thus, the external benefit of contraction is too small to offset the welfare benefit of any team, and the loss of any team is a net loss to society.
The Effects of Revenue Sharing
Without revenue sharing baseball would have little incentive to contract weak franchises.
The loss that other teams suffer from playing home games against weak teams is small, and substantially less than recent expansion fees in baseball. Five million dollars a year in lost revenues is more than offset by baseball's expansion fees, so that existing owners have been amply compensated for the lost attendance that established teams have experienced from adding two weak franchises, Miami and Tampa Bay. Thus, to discover the incentive to contract, one must examine the financial consequences of revenue sharing.
Zimbalist (2003) Montreal  525  568  Minnesota  431  477  Florida  426  446  Kansas City  400  427  Philadelphia  358  376  Oakland  345  386  Anaheim  336  354 Of course, these calculations assume that the low-revenue teams of 2001 are permanently in that status, which is not likely for Philadelphia and Anaheim. The point is to show that revenue sharing generates a powerful incentive to fold weak teams. Table 4 understates the extent to which the 2002 agreement increases the benefits to other teams from folding weaker franchises. By basing the calculations on actual 2001 revenues, these calculations assume that the new agreement will have no effect on relative team quality. In fact, because the marginal tax on team quality is so high, and higher among weaker teams, the more generous 2002 plan may cause competitive balance to worsen, and hence the gap in revenues between strong and weak teams to grow larger. If so, the financial benefits of contraction to the rest of the league would be even larger.
These numbers must be compared with the value of teams in markets that are candidates for relocation or expansion. The most attractive future expansion or relocation cites are the New Jersey suburbs of New York and the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C. If teams in these locations are as valuable as the best current baseball franchises, which is over $500 million, and if existing teams freely could relocate, the attraction of voluntary contraction would disappear.
The price that contracting owners would require to fold rather than to relocate would roughly equal the gains to the rest of the league. Other teams would do just as well by letting two weak teams move as by buying them at fair market value and then selling two expansion franchises.
Once the best locations are filled, the value of teams in the next most attractive cities probably is much lower, although the expansion franchises in Arizona and Colorado indicate that smaller cities have some chance of becoming lucrative homes for a new team. Hence, either contraction followed by expansion, or relocation of existing weak teams, is likely to leave remaining teams in the league better off. But here as well relocation is equally attractive as long as contracting owners must be compensated for the relocated value of their teams.
The implication of the preceding is that contraction is attractive under only two conditions. One is that baseball does not expect any time soon to occupy new locations, and the other is that baseball does not expect to allow teams to relocate, regardless of the difference in the attractiveness of available cities. In either case, the fair market price for an existing team is its value where it currently plays. For the weakest franchises, this value is likely to be less than the value of a franchise in several locations that currently lack teams.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis shows that revenue sharing creates a powerful incentive for the majority of baseball teams to favor contraction, especially if weak franchises can be folded at a cost below their value elsewhere. This analysis also shows that the contraction targets provide net economic benefits to society, although they may be unviable as business enterprises without revenue sharing. Thus, the institutional change that made weaker franchises financially more secure also made them vulnerable to elimination by fiat. Here the interests of players and owners coincide. Subsidized stadiums increase net revenues. The potential for greater revenues increases the market value of players, thereby bidding up their salaries. Thus, a second plausible motive for an agreement that seems inexorably to lead to contraction is that it will place pressure on local governments to build new stadiums for weak franchises. Should this come to pass, players and owners can have it both ways: expand into new, attractive locations, and make existing weak franchises healthier by acquiring new, subsidized stadiums for them. Source: Zimbalist (2003), Table 5 .5.
1. This analysis abstracts from the fact that leagues sell some products collectively in a national market, notably broadcast rights and product licenses. The implicit assumption here is that a team's contribution to pooled arrangements is determined by local market characteristics.
2. If decisions by one team affect decisions by others, the mechanism is likely to be that an improvement in the quality of one team increases the incremental value of skills to its rivals. If teams differ with respect to the magnitude of this effect, the allocation of skills among teams will not be efficient. The movement of baseball to a playoff structure involving many teams and to several divisions with few teams each most likely has increased the extent to which teams react strategically to player acquisitions by other teams, and therefore probably has reduced the efficiency of the player market.
3. For information about stadium costs, see Noll and Zimbalist (1997) .
4. In the larger league, team B can tie the first best team by winning one additional game against both A and C (6.7% likely), or can win the league outright by beating A more than twice (4.7% likely). In the smaller league, can tie by winning four games against A and all eight against C (about 0.9%) or by winning five or more games against A (about 0.4%). Thus, B is 11.4% likely to win the larger league and 1.4% likely to win the smaller league. 7. The main exception to the equal sharing rule is that expansion teams only share national revenues that were derived from contracts that were negotiated after they joined the league.
8. The summary on Major League Baseball's web site is incomplete and in some respects incomprehensible. The most complete public statement to my knowledge is on the following web site: roadsidephotos.com/baseball/02-3CBA.htm.
9. The effect will be less than the increase in the revenue-sharing proportion because players can not be cut below the minimum salary. Many players are at or near this threshold. In addition, the reduction in the demand for players is greater among high-revenue teams because their marginal tax on revenues has risen from 20 to 39 percent, whereas the marginal tax rate for low-revenue teams rose from 41 to 47 percent; however, above-average teams account for about 75 percent of player salaries, so the net reduction in demand for all teams is 16 percent.
10. In the long run, welfare would be reduced if lower salaries in baseball reduce the proportion of athletes who prepare themselves as youngsters to be baseball players.
11. Let t be the revenue-sharing tax, w be the share of unshared revenues paid to players, R be team revenues, and R* be average team revenues. Because each team receives tR* in receipts
